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1 Introduction
Many governments have recognized the importance of technological progress and corporate
innovation for domestic productivity growth. Fostering research and development (R&D) ac-
tivity of firms is therefore one of the key objectives when designing tax systems. An important
instrument in this field are patent box regimes. Patent boxes allow firms to exempt a large
share of profits related to intangible assets (mainly patents)1 from taxation and thus reduce
the effective tax rate on these profits. They differ substantially in their design, in particular
with regard to the type of patents that are taxed at the lower rate. In a global economy
with strong international links, such policies are likely to generate substantial cross-border
externalities. The goal of this paper is to identify the international spillover effects of patent
boxes with respect to corporate innovation.
Even though most governments claim to implement patent boxes mainly to facilitate do-
mestic R&D activity, the emergence of these regimes has raised several concerns. Not surpris-
ingly, the cross-border externalities that we investigate in this paper are at the heart of many
of these issues. First, it is not certain that patent boxes actually boost new R&D projects
and thus increase the overall level of corporate innovation. In response to the implementation
of a more favorable tax regime in one location, firms may merely relocate existing research
activity. Such a beggar-thy-neighbor effect is well-known for input-related R&D tax incentives
(Wilson, 2009). Second, the economic role of patent boxes is heavily debated. In the best case,
these regimes eliminate a market failure by increasing the net return of R&D to a level that
better reflects the positive externalities that arise due to knowledge spillovers. In the worst
case, patent boxes distort the allocation of R&D investment. Finally, patent box regimes may
affect tax revenue. If a patent transfer is used as a cross-border profit shifting vehicle, patent
boxes reduce tax revenues in countries with higher effective tax burdens and potentially also
in the patent box countries themselves because of the lower tax rate. However, if they spur
innovation that raises future profits, tax revenue may actually increase in the long-run.
Determining the sign and size of cross-border externalities of patent boxes is thus im-
portant to characterize the role of such regimes in an international context. In our paper,
we analyze these externalities using micro-level data for European firms. We link ownership
information for a large number of firms to R&D output. The latter is measured as the num-
ber of granted patent applications per firm and year. Cross-border links are established via
multinational companies. We identify the spillover effect of patent boxes on R&D activity by
estimating the response of a firm to the exogenous patent box implementation in the location
of one of its affiliates.2 As we are interested in cross-border effects of patent boxes rather than
their domestic impact, we focus on the research activity of firms that are located in countries
without a patent box regime.
1Some patent boxes also allow for the inclusion of trade marks or other intellectual property.
2See Figure 4 in the Appendix for a graphical illustration of this concept.
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In our analysis, we differentiate between patent boxes with and without nexus requirement.
The former only applies the reduced tax rate if at least part of the research activity has
been carried out in the respective country. In contrast, the latter also taxes patents at the
favorable rate that have been generated elsewhere. This is usually done by including existing
and acquired patents in the patent box which provides firms with a simple profit shifting
opportunity: They conduct R&D at the location of their choice and then transfer the resulting
patent to a patent box location without nexus requirement in order to benefit from the lower
tax rates there. These regimes thus lower the user cost of capital for R&D activity in the
group as a whole through a mechanism that is very similar to the role of tax havens in Hong
& Smart (2010). In fact, this similarity is not surprising. Countries that implement patent
boxes without nexus requirement effectively become tax havens for a particular asset. Below,
we thus refer to these regimes as patent havens. We expect patent havens to generate positive
cross-border externalities on R&D activity. For patent boxes with nexus requirement, such an
effect should not be observed since the profit shifting opportunity is limited in this case.
We test these hypotheses with a Poisson fixed effects count model which relates the number
of domestically developed patents of a firm to the implementation of a foreign patent box while
controlling for various location-, firm- and group-specific variables that might drive innovation
activity. Our estimation results suggest that the implementation of a foreign patent haven (no
nexus requirement) raises R&D activity from about one patent every three years to about
one patent every one and a half years. We capture the treatment intensity by interacting
the implementation indicator with the implied tax rate difference between firm and affiliate
location and find that the patent haven implementation leads to an increase of R&D activity
by 2.3% per percentage point of this difference. For patent boxes with nexus requirement, we
find negative, and much smaller cross-border externalities. However, the estimated coefficients
are not significant.
These findings are robust to controlling for domestic tax-related input incentives such
as super-deductions and credits. They also pertain when we adjust the patent count for
heterogeneity in the patent quality. We further ensure robustness by conducting a number of
sample checks with regard to the structure and activity of the corporate group. In addition,
we replicate our results using different estimation methods such as propensity score matching
and coarsened exact matching as well as an event-study design. In an extension, we show that
the output related tax incentive provided by patent boxes transmits to the structure of R&D
inputs.
We also find that both types of patent box regimes reduce the average patent quality in
related firms abroad. This result can be explained by the spatial sorting of patents according
to their profitability which is similar to the sorting mechanism of firms with different levels
of productivity in Melitz et al. (2004). Nexus patent boxes probably lead to the reallocation
of the most profitable patents while patent havens allow the firm to realize more but also less
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profitable R&D projects.
Our analysis contributes to the large literature that relates tax policy to R&D activity.
In particular, researchers have established a link between corporate taxation and investment
in R&D (Mamuneas & Nadiri, 1996; Bloom et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009), the location choice of
intangible assets within multinational firms (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky & Riedel,
2012; Griffith et al., 2014) and the quality of patents (Ernst et al., 2014). Only few papers
analyze international spillovers of tax policy, but all of them rely on macro-level data of R&D
activity. For example, Wilson (2009) focuses on input-related incentives and uses aggregate
data on R&D spending from US states to show that a large part of the R&D increasing effect
of tax credits is due to a reallocation of research activity between states. In contrast, our
paper uses micro-level data to establish positive cross-border externalities of output-related
tax incentives as a novel effect of tax policy on R&D.
In addition, we also contribute to the growing literature on patent box regimes. In this
field, more normative analyses (e.g. Evers et al., 2015) have recently been complemented by
empirical studies (e.g. Bradley et al., 2015). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first to empirically analyze cross-border externalities of patent boxes on R&D activity.
Finally, our analysis is related to the literature on tax havens. As noted above, by im-
plementing patent boxes, the respective countries effectively become low-tax locations for
intangible assets. Thus, the criticism that is put forward against tax havens (e.g. Dharma-
pala, 2008; Slemrod & Wilson, 2009) may also apply to patent box countries. Depending on
their design, they may divert firm profits away from the location of real activity and thus
erode the tax base of high-tax locations. Alternatively one could apply the more positive view
of Hong & Smart (2010) and Desai et al. (2006). They argue that low-tax jurisdictions may
be beneficial because they enable governments to implicitly differentiate between mobile and
immobile firms, even if they cannot distinguish between the two types or are not willing to do
so because of political reasons. As a first-order effect, allowing mobile firms to shift profits to
low-tax locations lowers the user cost of capital in high-tax locations and increases investment
there. The assumption underlying these arguments is that there are real responses of domestic
firms to tax incentives abroad. Our empirical results suggest that such a mechanism exists
with regard to investments with mobile profits such as R&D activity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a stylized the-
oretical framework for our analysis and characterizes existing patent boxes. We explain the
empirical strategy in Section 3 and describe the data collection in Section 4. Results are
presented in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes.
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2 Cross-border Externalities from Patent Boxes
2.1 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we set up a stylized theoretical framework to analyze the reaction of a firm’s
R&D activity to the introduction of a patent box in a country where one of its foreign affili-
ates resides. For simplicity, we consider a multinational enterprise (MNE) i that is located in
country h and has an affiliate in country p. As we are interested in the cross-border spillovers
of the patent box implementation, our focus is on the number of successfully realized research
projects in h rather than the overall research activity in the group. The firm makes three
decisions: it chooses whether or not to realize projects from a given set of potential undertak-
ings indicated by s = 1, ..., ni and then decides on the location of R&D activity and on the
location of ownership. The two location decisions do not necessarily coincide and depend on
the characteristics of h and p such as R&D related fixed costs and tax rates. All three choices
jointly determine the number of realized research projects in h.
Let us define the return to a research project s by rs = (1− t)pis − c where (1− t)pis
is the net profit (i.e. revenue less deductible cost after taxes) and c is some non-deductible
fixed cost. The effective tax rate t and the fixed costs c are functions of the ownership and
R&D location choice of the firm. c comprises items that are hard to price and usually not
considered as deductible expenses such as the cost of risk-taking in R&D investments, the
cost of becoming acquainted with local patenting institutions or the cost to identify suitable
researchers. This type of cost may substantially differ between the two affiliate locations.
In the case of co-location of R&D activity and ownership, t = tl, c = cl, l ∈ {h, p}.
Alternatively, the firm may geographically separate the R&D and the corresponding ownership
right. There are various ways to do this, including the direct transfer of patent rights, contract
R&D and cost sharing agreements between the two affiliates (Griffith et al., 2014). Effectively,
all of these arrangements result in part of the profit from the research project being taxed
in a location different from the one where the R&D activity was carried out and thus have
qualitatively similar consequences. The organizational form of the geographical allocation of
patent rights is, however, a crucial feature for the empirical identification. We discuss this in
more detail below.
For now, we assume that a share α of the profit of a research project conducted in h whose
legal ownership has been assigned to p is taxed at tp while the remaining profit is taxed in h.
t is thus given by
t = αtp + (1− α) th, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The parameter α captures the extend to which a reduction in the tax burden is inhibited both
by regulations in the country of the transferor (e.g. CFC rules or exit taxes) and in the country
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of the recipient. The former are likely to be orthogonal to the patent box implementation while
the latter are directly linked to the setup of the exploited patent box. For example, α is small
if the patent box in p excludes R&D profits for projects conducted outside of p (nexus patent
box). In contrast, α may be close to 1 if the patent box regime in p includes existing and
acquired patents (patent haven).
Depending on the choices of the firm, the profit of a research project s is thus given by
rhs = (1− th)pis − ch if R&D activity and ownership in h,
rh,ps = (1− th + α∆t)pis − ch if R&D activity in h and ownership in p,
rps = (1− tp)pis − cp if R&D activity and ownership in p.
where ∆t = th−tp. To simplify the derivation, we assume that firm i incurs higher fixed costs if
it relocates its research activity to country p (i.e. cp > ch). Besides the specific characteristics
of the fixed costs described above, this reflects potential reallocation costs which include
the establishment of new organizational R&D structures in p and the effort for convincing
researchers to move.
To compute the number of realized research projects, we assume that the firm first decides
on whether or not to realize a particular project s and then simultaneously determines where
to optimally locate R&D activity and legal ownership. If the two locations do not differ in the
applicable tax rate ∆t = 0, we have rhs > r
h,p
s , r
p
s and the firm locates both legal ownership
and R&D activity in h. It realizes all research projects with a positive return, that is any
project s for which pis > p˜i
h = ch1−th . We can sort the gross profits of all available projects
along the interval (
¯
pii, p¯ii) and define the corresponding cumulative distribution function F .
The number of realized research projects of firm i is then given by ni
(
1− F (p˜ih)).
A more realistic assumption would be to let ∆t 6= 0. For simplicity we consider ∆t > 0,
although similar insights are obtained when the sign of the tax differential is reversed. As
there are no fixed costs for separating ownership and activity, legal ownership is assigned to
p in this case.3 R&D activity is also located to p if rps > r
h,p
s or pis > p˜i =
cp−ch
(1−α)∆t . Again,
only research projects with a positive return are realized. This implies that, if it is optimal to
separate legal ownership and real activity, any project s with pis > p˜i
∗ = ch1−th+α∆t is realized.
If the return is maximized by co-locating activity and ownership, the necessary gross profit
threshold for s to be realized is pis > p˜i
p =
cp
1−tp .
Let us assume for illustrative purposes that p˜ip < p˜i∗ < p˜i.4 The overall number of finished
3To make the framework more realistic, one could introduce some fixed costs to separating ownership and
activity which would result in the ownership of some research projects being located in h even if th > tp. This
would make our model slightly more complicated without adding any further insights with regard to the main
effect of interest.
4Various orders of the threshold profits are possible but yield the less interesting case where all research
activity is located to p irrespective of the change in the tax rate differential.
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projects is then given by ni (1− F (p˜i∗)) with ni (1− F (p˜i)) projects realized in p and the
number of realized R&D projects of firm i in location h given by
Pi = ni (F (p˜i)− F (p˜i∗)) . (1)
How is Pi affected by the implementation of a patent box in p? Such a regime lowers tp
and thus increases the tax differential ∆t. The change in the number of realized R&D projects
in h as a result of an increase in the tax differential of d∆t is given by
dPi = ni
(
− (1− α) f (p˜i) (cp − ch)
((1− α) ∆t)2 + α
f (p˜i∗) ch
(1− th + α∆t)2
)
d∆t. (2)
The sign of the effect depends on how much the separation of ownership and real activity
for tax purposes is inhibited by regulations. For example, if the patent box requires full nexus
in location p, that is α = 0, one would observe a negative effect of the patent box regime on
R&D activity in h. In this case, cross-border reallocation of ownership (and thus profits) from
h to p is not an option and the tax reduction in p does not affect the cost of R&D capital in h.
Rather, activity for sufficiently profitable research projects is located to p, reducing the overall
number of realized projects in h.5 In contrast, a patent haven (no nexus requirement) has a
positive effect on research output in h. Abstracting from inhibiting factors in the transferor
location, we have α = 1 in this case and thus dPi > 0. As the firm is able to relocate the
ownership of some projects realized in h to p, the tax cut there also reduces the user cost of
R&D capital in h and increases research output.
In Figure 1 we display the effect of the patent box introduction graphically. We plot the
density function of the profits of available research projects and mark the relevant cut-off
profits. Initially, the firm realizes projects with profits greater than p˜i∗ but allocates R&D
activity of projects with profits greater than p˜i to p. The overall share of projects realized in
h is thus given by A+B. The introduction of a patent box in p shifts p˜i and p˜i∗ to p˜i′ and p˜i∗′,
respectively, such that the share of realized projects is given by A+B′. The overall effect relies
on a comparison of B and B′ which in turn depends on the setup of the patent box. B′ refers
to the increase of realized R&D projects in h because of the reduction in the user cost of R&D
capital captured in the second term of equation (2). B describes the R&D activity which is
shifted to p because of the foreign tax cut that reduces the number of projects realized in
h and is reflected in the first term of expression (2). For a patent haven α is close to 1 and
B = 0 such that we obtain an increase in the share of R&D projects realized in h by B′.
In contrast, when a nexus patent box is implemented, B and B′ may neutralize each other
leaving the number of research projects in h unchanged. Eventually, the direction of the effect
5Note that this does not necessarily imply that overall research activity of the multinational company
decreases. If the tax benefits in p are large enough, the total number of patents may even increase. This occurs,
however, only because the increase in research activity in p more than compensates for the decrease in h.
Research activity in h always decreases.
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Figure 1: Profit distribution and realized R&D projects
f (pis)
pis
p˜i∗p˜i∗′ p˜ip˜i′ p¯i¯
pi
B′ A B
is an empirical question and our analysis points out that it is important to take into account
the precise incentive structure of the investigated patent box.
Finally, we observe that the average profit of realized patents in h decreases with the
implementation of a patent box in p. This can easily be seen when comparing the average
profits of the different fractions of research projects in Figure 1. A formal analysis of this result
is presented in Appendix A.3. The sign of the effect is independent of the nexus requirement
of the patent box, but it follows different intuitions in each case. A patent haven lowers
average patent profits because it allows R&D projects with lower profitability to be realized
in h. Nexus patent boxes reduce the average profit in h because R&D activity for the most
profitable projects is relocated to p. The latter mechanism is related to the one described
for international trade by Melitz et al. (2004) who show that only the most productive firms
relocate internationally. Furthermore, Haufler & Sta¨hler (2013) show in a tax competition
model, that more profitable projects sort into low-tax jurisdictions. Empirical evidence by
Becker et al. (2012) suggests that this effect contributes significantly to the overall tax base
location effect of corporate taxes. In our firm-level analysis below, we show that a similar
mechanism is particularly relevant for corporate R&D activity.
2.2 Patent Boxes and Patent Location in Practice
Before empirically testing our analytical results, it is useful to relate the model to the patent
boxes that exist in practice. Evers et al. (2015) and Alstadsater et al. (2015) provide a com-
prehensive overview of the various regimes that have been established since 2000. In Table 1
we summarize key elements of existing patent box regimes in Europe. In general, firms enjoy
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substantial reductions in effective tax payments when opting for these regimes but significant
differences remain. Patent boxes differ in the treatment of expenses as well as in the types of
intangible assets, beyond patents (e.g. trademarks, brands), they may be applied to. The ex-
tent of the tax exemption varies significantly across locations. For instance, while the tax rate
on profits from patents is reduced by 35 percentage points in Cyprus, firms only enjoy a 50%
exemption in Portugal which implies a decrease in the statutory tax rate of 11.25 percentage
points.
Table 1: Patent box regimes in European countries
Country Year of imple-
mentation
Corporate
income tax
rate (2015)
Patent box tax
rate (2015)
Acquired
Patents
Existing
Patents
France 2000 34.0 16.8 Yes Yes
Hungary 2003 19.0 9.5 Yes Yes
Netherlands 2007 25.0 5.0 No No
Spain 2008 30.0 12.0 No Yes
Belgium 2008 34.0 6.8 No No
Luxembourg 2008 29.2 5.8 No No
Malta 2010 35.0 0.0 Yes Yes
Cyprus 2012 10.0 2.5 Yes Yes
United Kingdom 2013 20.0 12.0 No Yes
Portugal 2014 22.5 11.3 No No
Italy 2015 31.4 22.0 No No
Turkey 2015 20.0 10.0 No No
Ireland 2016 12.5 6.3 No No
Source: IBFD; Alstadsater et al. (2015); Evers et al. (2015). Note: Ireland initially introduced a patent box regime in
1973 but abolished it in 2010. It was reintroduced in 2016.
The inclusion of a nexus requirement in patent box regimes is relevant for the sign of their
cross-border externalities. Existing patent boxes again differ substantially with respect to this
characteristic. In the sense of our analytical framework, a nexus requirement is a regulation
that restricts the lower tax rate to income from patents for which also the underlying R&D
activity has been carried out in the respective country. In this regard, it is crucial how acquired
patents are treated in the patent box. Excluding them effectively precludes tax benefits from
a post-generation patent transfer. Some countries directly prohibit the inclusion of acquired
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patents into the patent box (Spain, Portugal). Other regimes include acquired patents but
require that these have been further developed to a substantial degree at the location where the
resulting profits are taxed (Belgium, Ireland6, Netherlands, United Kingdom). In Luxembourg,
only patents acquired from an unrelated party outside the corporate group are included in the
patent box. Patent boxes that have been implemented more recently (Italy, Ireland) comply
with the Modified Nexus Approach adopted by the EU and the OECD. This approach allows
only for a certain share of intellectual property income, which corresponds to the share of
research conducted by the firm itself, to be included in the patent box.7 Effectively, all of
these patent boxes require that a substantial part of the research activity must be conducted
in the respective country for the lower patent box rate to take effect. As a consequence, profit
shifting opportunities are limited and these regimes are thus unlikely to generate positive
cross-border spillovers on R&D activity.
In contrast, several patent box regimes include acquired and existing patents (France,
Hungary, Malta, Cyprus) without effective restrictions.8 Since this allows firms to conduct
the actual development of the patent elsewhere and then transfer the resulting patent right
to the patent box location, these regimes correspond to the patent havens described in the
theoretical analysis.
As pointed out above, an institutional feature that is crucial to identify cross-border
spillovers of patent boxes on R&D output is the way MNEs separate patent ownership and
R&D activity. Previous studies that estimate the elasticity of legal ownership of a patent
in a particular jurisdiction with respect to the applicable tax rate have argued that, if the
separation of R&D activity and ownership occurs, this is done mainly through contract R&D
and cost sharing arrangements whereby the patent applicant would also be the final owner
(Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014).9 In contrast, actual transfers of patents via
intra-company sales are less attractive because of their adverse tax effects. The assumption
appears sensible given that these studies cover periods when many developed countries in
Europe applied CFC rules that should substantially diminish potential tax benefits of cross-
border patent transfers.10 In such an institutional environment contract R&D or cost sharing
6In 2008, Ireland extended the scope of its patent box to patent income resulting from R&D conducted
in any EEA member state. However, the reform also imposed an upper limit of 5 mio EUR for the income
to which the exemption is applied. Furthermore, income from within-company licensing was only included in
the patent box if the royalties were paid by a manufacturing firm. This prohibits the setup of effective profit
shifting structures through holding entities.
7It is also expected that from 2016 onward the other regimes will adopt this approach and change their
patent box legislation accordingly.
8In France, the only limitation is that acquired patents must be held for at least 2 years by the acquiring
company for the resulting profits to be taxed under the patent box regime.
9In fact, this is an important assumption for these studies to gauge the effect of corporate tax rates on
patent location using patent application data because post-application transfers of patents are not recorded in
the databases used in these estimations.
10Griffith et al. (2014) study patent applications from 1985 to 2005, Karkinsky & Riedel (2012) observe annual
patent applications of European firms from 1995 to 2003. According to Bra¨utigam et al. (2017), Germany,
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are probably attractive modes of cross-border ownership allocation.
However, the institutional environment with respect to CFC rules has changed over the
last decade. The 2006 Cadbury-Schweppes ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has
effectively limited the applicability of CFC rules within the European Economic Area (EEA)
and, as a consequence, most member states have amended their regimes to exclude affiliates
in the EEA (Bra¨utigam et al., 2017). The remaining threat to the realization of tax benefits
in cross-border patent transfers are exit taxes on the capital gains realized in these transfers.
In this regard, recent ECJ rulings have stipulated that firms should at least be allowed to
defer the tax payment until such gains have materialized11 and the European Commission
has asked several EU member states, including the United Kingdom, to adjust their exit
tax legislation accordingly. Thus, the factors that inhibit the realization of tax benefits from
cross-border transfer of patents have certainly been mitigated. In fact, a recent anonymized
survey by Heckemeyer et al. (2015) among large multinational companies reveals that, while
exit taxes are an issue of concern, MNEs still consider the selling of patents to foreign affiliates
a feasible way to transfer ownership across borders.12 A possible reason for this observation
may be that it is particularly difficult for tax authorities to examine the true value of recently
granted patents with no revenues attached which makes it easy to set transfer prices in such
a way that MNEs can realize tax benefits from cross-border transfers. At the same time,
direct patent transfers avoid problems of cost sharing or contract R&D arrangements, some
of which are unrelated to taxation such as communication cost between the involved affiliates
during and uncertainty with regard to the outcome of the R&D project. Furthermore, many
input-related incentives for R&D (e.g. direct subsidies, tax credits) usually do not apply to
research carried out as a service to another company which implies that research activity in
contract R&D arrangements cannot benefit from them.
In line with Dischinger & Riedel (2011) we conclude that the post-generation transfer of
intangible assets such as patents is a viable mode of ownership relocation for tax purposes.
It follows that it is feasible to identify the cross-border effect of patent boxes using patent
application data as the initial applicant is likely to have conducted the research project while
preserving the option of a transfer for tax purposes at a later point in time. With regard
to patent boxes, this view is confirmed by recent findings on patent transfers. For instance,
Gaessler et al. (2017) estimate that the implementation of patent boxes in the recipient country
that include acquired and existing patents (i.e. no nexus requirement) significantly increases
the number of annual bilateral patent transfers. This is consistent with the notion that this
type of patent box regimes incentivizes the separation of ownership and R&D activity as
Denmark, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and Sweden had CFC rules with
respect to other European countries in 2003.
11E.g. National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond C-371/10 ( NGI ) and C-657/13
Verder LabTec GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt Hilden
12The survey also finds that cost sharing agreements are much less important which may reflect that they are
primarily a phenomenon in MNEs with US parents due to institutional reasons (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011).
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suggested above.
Even if R&D contract arrangements remain relevant, this would exert a downward bias on
our estimates of cross-border spillovers. While the patent box implementation in one affiliate
may actually raise R&D output in another non-patent box affiliate of an MNE, this would
in some cases not be observed in the patent application data since the final applicant would
be the patent box affiliate as the internal buyer of R&D services. In this case, our estimate
would have to be interpreted as a lower bound of the true effect.
3 Empirical Identification
3.1 Patent Output
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of foreign tax reductions for patent profits on
domestic R&D activity. This is achieved by analyzing the cross-border effect of patent box
implementations in countries where firms have foreign affiliates. Following previous studies
(e.g. Blundell et al., 1995; Stiebale, 2016), R&D activity of a firm is measured by its newly
registered annual output of granted patents.13 More formally, we model the number of newly
granted patent applications Pijct of firm i which is member of multinational group j and is
located in country c in period t as a function of the availability of international patent boxes
to a foreign affiliate and several control variables. We estimate a Poisson fixed effects model
(see Hausman et al., 1984; Wooldridge, 1999; Cameron & Trivedi, 2015) of the following form:
E (Pijct) = exp
(
x′ijctβ
)
with x′ijctβ = α ·BOXjt + βXit + γZjt + δCct + φt + φi + uit. (3)
BOXjt is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a patent box is implemented in the country
of residence of at least one of the foreign affiliates of firm i and zero otherwise. Xit, Zjt
and Cct are firm-, group- and location-specific characteristics. φt and φi capture time- and
firm-specific effects.
In the estimation, we differentiate between nexus patent boxes (some nexus requirement)
and patent havens (no nexus requirement). The main focus of the analysis is on the latter
since we expect the strongest spillovers from these regimes. They are defined as patent boxes
that include both acquired and existing patents and thus allow firms to realize tax benefits
through the post-generation cross-border transfer of patents (see Table 1). In contrast, the
nexus patent boxes apply the favorable rate mainly to profits from R&D activity that has
been conducted in the respective location. Therefore, these patent boxes are less suitable for
13Granted applications are commonly used in the literature (e.g. Aghion et al., 2013; Seru, 2014; Stiebale,
2016; Bena & Li, 2014) because they better capture actual research activity rather than strategic patent filing.
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profit shifting via patent transfers. This means that they lower R&D cost of capital in other
locations to a much smaller extent. Hence, we do not expect substantial spillovers.
We restrict our analysis to firms located in non-patent box countries. This is done for two
reasons. First, external effects of patent boxes should generally not be observed at locations
where a patent box is already implemented since in this case, the foreign tax regime does
not provide an additional incentive. Second, as the focus of this study are spillover effects of
patent boxes, patent box locations must be excluded to avoid any distorting effects of the im-
plementation of domestic patent boxes that may or may not coincide with the implementation
of patent boxes abroad.
The identification of the spillover effect relies on the assumption that, prior to the im-
plementation of a patent box, firms with affiliates in the implementing countries are not
systematically different with respect to the evolution of their R&D activity from those that
do not have affiliates in these locations. We verify this below again focusing on patent havens.
Most importantly, we show that even though treated and non-treated firms in our sample
differ in the level of their R&D activity, the patent output trends similarly for the two groups
until the occurrence of the first patent haven.
A further potential source of endogeneity is the structure of the multinational group. In
principal, MNEs that comprise firms which expect an increase in their research activity have
an incentive to set up a new affiliate in a country as soon as a new patent box regime is
introduced there. To overcome this potential issue of reverse causality, only multinational
groups without changes in their structure with respect to patent box locations are considered
in the empirical analysis.14 As a consequence, BOXjt is an exogenous shock to the firm’s tax
incentives insofar as it is purely driven by exogenous policy changes in the residence countries
of its affiliates. Identification thus hinges on the variation in the timing of the introduction of
national patent box regimes.
The macroeconomic and institutional control variables include productivity measured as
the log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, general research activity measured by R&D expen-
ditures as a percentage of GDP and the corporate income tax rate. One concern with regard
to our analysis may be that those countries without a patent box have instead turned to
input-related tax incentives in order to remain competitive R&D locations. If these alterna-
tive incentives are the main drivers of the observed rise in domestic patenting activity, this
would still hint to international spillover effects of patent boxes. Instead of a direct impact on
the user cost of capital, the spillover would then be a result of policy interactions in a fiscal
competition game. In order not to capture such spurious effects, we include the user cost of
capital for R&D in our estimation which is a composite measure that includes input-related
tax incentives such as tax credits and super-deductions for R&D activity.15 We also control for
14Our results are robust to excluding only those groups with a change in ownership with respect to patent
box locations within three years prior to the implementation of the respective regime.
15See Appendix A.3 for a detailed derivation.
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several items that have been suggested to affect R&D activity on the firm level (see Stiebale,
2016), such as the number of affiliates, the age of a firm as well as the firm size measured in
total assets, the working capital and the capital intensity of a firm. Finally, we include firm-
and time-fixed effects to capture cross-sectional differences in the level of R&D output, as well
as general time trends.
The number of patents is primarily measured as the count of annual granted patents per
firm. To capture the intensity of domestic R&D activity, we also conduct our analysis using
the quality-weighted number of new patents. Frequently cited patents registered at multiple
patent offices and classified to contribute to many patenting classes are not only potentially
more valuable (see Harhoff et al., 1999), but also point to a higher R&D input (Hagedoorn
& Cloodt, 2003). We construct patent quality using the composite quality indicator proposed
by Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004) which is commonly used in this strand of literature (see,
e.g., Hall et al., 2007 and Ernst et al., 2014). The composite quality indicator is derived by
employing a multiple-indicator model relying on the number of forward citations, the patent
family size and the number of patent classifications resulting in a relative measure for patent
quality. The procedure to derive it is described in detail in Appendix A.3. For the quality-
weighted number of new patents, we weight each patent by its relative quality.
3.2 Patent Quality
We also estimate the effect of a foreign patent box implementation on the average quality of
new patents of a firm to test our theoretical predictions with regard to the cross-border effect
of patent boxes on the quality of R&D output. The latter is computed by dividing the quality-
weighted patent count by the number of patents, qijct =
P qual.ijct
Pijct
. To account for general quality
shifts within the same industry as well as level differences across industries and countries, we
then scale this measure by its 2-digit SIC industry, country- and year-specific mean q¯sct and
obtain q˜ijct =
qijct
q¯sct
. We relate the logarithm of this relative measure to foreign patent box
implementations in the following fixed effects regression:
log (q˜ijct) = ι+ α ·BOXjt + βXit + γZjt + δCct + φt + φi + uit (4)
The specification of variables is the same as for equation (3).
Note that we are only able to compute the average quality of patents for firm-year observa-
tions where the firm successfully applied for a patent. In order to not distort our estimation by
potentially confounding effects of the patenting decision of a firm, we restrict this regression
to firms that generate patents before and after a patent box was implemented in a country
where one of their foreign affiliates resides.16
16We also estimated equation 4 on the full sample and obtain virtually the same result.
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Table 2: New Patents, 2000-2012
Number of
firms in sample
Share of firms with affiliate in
patent box location
Avg. new dom.
patents per year
Avg. new dom.
patents per year
(qual. wt.)Patent Haven Nexus Patent
Box
AT 900 0.14 0.15 0.40 0.21
BG 66 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.08
CH 1,018 0.27 0.25 0.43 0.26
CZ 727 0.04 0.04 0.25 0.09
DE 10,207 0.11 0.12 0.38 0.20
DK 452 0.14 0.17 0.31 0.19
EE 43 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.10
FI 435 0.13 0.15 0.37 0.21
GB 3,256 0.16 0.19 0.30 0.19
GR 13 0.23 0.07 0.33 0.21
HR 18 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.07
IS 8 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.11
IT 3,056 0.06 0.06 0.30 0.16
LT 19 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.06
LV 42 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.06
NO 461 0.07 0.10 0.26 0.16
PL 422 0.06 0.07 0.29 0.14
RO 145 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.08
SE 737 0.20 0.21 0.33 0.21
SI 142 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.11
TR 392 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.07
Total 22,559 0.11 0.12 0.34 0.19
4 Data
4.1 Patent Data
The analysis is based on a rich panel dataset built by combining multiple data sources on
patent data, firm information and patent box characteristics. Patent data is taken from the
PATSTAT database operated by the European Patent Office (EPO). PATSTAT is a compre-
hensive data source covering patent data for over 80 countries in a harmonized way (Jacob,
2013). For the econometric analysis we count the number of granted patents per firm for each
year.17
17Since it can take multiple years between application and approval of a patent, we account for this time lag
between generating an innovation and acceptance of the patent application by using the date of first patenting
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In our analysis we focus on domestically developed patents. In principal, the country
of residence of the firm applying for a patent does not necessarily constitute the place of
development of the patent. As is common in the literature, we identify whether or not a
patent was developed at the location of the firm by using address information of the inventors
(Guellec & de la Potterie, 2001). A patent is classified as domestic if the majority of its
inventors reside in the same country as the applicant firm.18 We remove outliers by trimming
the sample at the 99 percentile of annual domestic patent output.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the firm locations we include in our sample.19
Research activity is particularly strong in Switzerland, Austria and Germany with average
annual domestically developed patents per firm of 0.43, 0.40 and 0.38 respectively.
4.2 Ownership and Firm Data
We obtain PATSTAT patent data through Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. This allows us
to link patents of the applying firms to the comprehensive ownership information contained
in the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database via common identifiers. The firm level databases
by Bureau van Dijk are unique in two important ways. First, they provide information on the
organizational structure of multinational firms around the globe. Second, they contain firm-
level balance sheet data in an internationally comparable format. Both features are crucial for
the analysis of cross-border spillovers through MNEs and have also been exploited to identify
other types of international transmissions (e.g. Cravino & Levchenko, 2017).
Using the ownership information, we are able to identify the ultimate owner for each
firm in the sample. We construct multinational groups by assigning firms with a common
ultimate owner to the same group. This approach is complemented by checking whether the
firm existed throughout the whole observation period to exclude tax-driven affiliate establish-
ment in patent box countries. Finally, we combine the ownership information with data on
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database to capture owner-
ship changes within the observation period. We exclude all groups where the firm structure
changed with respect to the patent box locations displayed in Table 1. That is, all groups are
excluded where one of the affiliates in a patent box location has been established, acquired or
sold during our sample period. In line with Stiebale (2016), we further restrict our sample to
industries where patenting is actually relevant. We include firms active in the manufacturing
sector as well as several knowledge-intensive service sectors such as information technology,
telecommunications, transport, R&D, or business-related services.20 Table 2 provides infor-
application instead of the patent publication date.
18For those patents with no inventor information provided by PATSTAT, it is assumed that the patent was
developed domestically. As a robustness check, it is also assumed that all patents without inventor information
provided are non-domestic ones. The results still hold true implying that these patents are not systematically
different from those with inventor information.
19An overview of the sample selection process is displayed in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
20This excludes financial services. We identify relevant sectors via 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes and include
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mation on the geographical distribution of firm observations over the 22 locations that remain
after excluding patent box locations.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Number of
Observations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
New patent appl. 260,103 0.342 0.867 0 7
New patent appl. (qual. adj.) 260,103 0.188 0.526 0 6.582
BOXHaven 260,103 0.113 0.317 0 1
BOXNexus 260,103 0.080 0.270 0 1
∆t 250,551 1.782 6.376 0 31.4
Number of affiliates 260,103 11.655 43.357 1 1,094
Log Age 253,123 2.672 1.041 0 6.592
Log Total Assets 260,069 9.154 2.473 -8.151 17.342
Working Capital 260,069 -7.154 2,084.461 -769,074 344,886
Log Capital Intensity 251,390 -2.774 2.262 -24.089 10.901
Corporate income tax rate 260,103 32.003 6.964 10 52
User cost of R&D capital 260,103 0.345 0.023 0.115 0.364
Real interest rate 251,321 0.056 0.020 -0.014 0.265
R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 258,481 2.121 0.723 0.323 3.914
Log GDP p.c. 260,103 10.416 0.431 7.920 11.143
GDP Growth 260,103 1.443 2.682 -14.814 11.902
We also obtain balance sheet items as well as firm age from Amadeus. Working capital is
computed by scaling the difference between current assets and current liabilities with total
assets, while capital intensity is defined as the ratio of tangible fixed assets and sales.21
Macroeconomic control variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI) and the OECD. Tax policy indicators are collected from the IBFD tax
database. When computing the user cost of capital, we follow Bloom et al. (2002) and in-
corporate the input incentives, the applicable tax rate and the fixed depreciation rate into a
measure for the user cost of a domestic R&D investment. In order to isolate the effect of tax
policy on R&D activity, we calculate the user cost using a fixed interest rate of 5%.22
We restrict our sample to the period 2000-2012. Before 2000, information on balance
sheets and shareholders in the Bureau van Dijk database is sparse and the Zephyr database
is fragmentary23 so there is no reliable information on M&A that would also identify the
firms with codes 10-32, 51-53, 58-63, 69-74 and 77-82.
21Missing entries for the necessary variables are replaced by annual industry (2-digit US SIC code) means.
22See Appendix A.3 for a detailed description of the calculation of user cost of capital.
23See Table 1 in Bollaert & Delanghe (2015).
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Table 4: Treated vs. Non-treated Firms
Panel A: Distribution Across Industries (Share of firms in industry)
Manufacturing Transportation
and Storage
Information &
Communication
Professional,
Scientific &
Technical
Activities
Administrative
& Support
Service
Activities
Treated 0.8069 0.0021 0.0282 0.1394 0.0233
Non-treated 0.7371 0.0042 0.0440 0.1828 0.0319
Panel B: Means of Key Variables
User cost of
R&D Capital
CIT Log GDP per
capita
Total Assets
(th. USD)
Age No. of
affiliates
Treated 0.35 32.23 10.43 173,582.76 27.46 66.39
Non-treated 0.340 30.49 10.32 122,265.82 22.13 3.28
vendor in such deals.24 We stop our sample period in 2012 because from 2013 onward, several
large European economies (including United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal) implemented domestic
patent box regimes. This means that we cannot include these locations in our analysis of cross-
border spillovers of patent boxes.25 Furthermore, the process of granting patents usually takes
several years, such that for more recent periods we do not yet observe the full amount of R&D
output. Table 3 provides summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis.
4.3 Identifying Assumptions
As mentioned above, for the cross-border effect of patent boxes to be identified, we require
firms with affiliates in patent havens (treated) and those that do not have affiliates in these
countries (non-treated) to be comparable. We begin by observing various characteristics of
the two types of firms. In Table 4 we display the distribution across industries (NACE Rev. 2
divisions) of the two groups (Panel A) and state the within-group averages for key variables
(Panel B). Treated and non-treated firms have a similar distribution across industries, with the
majority of patenting firms in the manufacturing and services sectors. They are also similar
with respect to location-specific variables such as the user cost of R&D capital, the statutory
corporate income tax rate and GDP per capita. This implies that firms with affiliates in
patent box countries are not clustered in certain locations and, therefore, our results are not
24The SDC Thomson Reuters database, which would be an alternative to Zephyr, contains the variable
“seller”. However, entries are missing in the vast majority of cases.
25In a robustness check, we extended the sample to 2014 but excluded firms located in countries with patent
boxes after their implementation. The results remain highly significant with coefficients of similar size.
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Figure 2: R&D Activity Over Time
(a) Evolution of Patent Output
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driven by such a clustering. The two groups differ, however, with respect to size (measured
in total assets), age and the number of affiliates within their corporate group. Firms with
foreign affiliates in patent havens are larger, older and more often part of large multinational
groups. This difference in levels is, however, not surprising as a large part of the non-treated
firms operates domestically. We control for this by including the respective variables in our
regression model.
R&D activity in treated and non-treated firms may still be subject to different time trends
which are driven by unobservable factors. In Panel (a) of Figure 2 we plot the evolution of the
average number of patents per firm for treated and non-treated firms in our sample over time
to verify whether such factors are behind our result. We observe that for the years before the
occurrence of the first patent haven (2003, Hungary), the trends of the two groups are very
similar. After 2003, R&D activity slightly increases in firms with affiliates in patent havens
relative to those without. We attribute this increase to the decrease in the user cost of capital
for R&D investment induced by the profit shifting opportunities arising from the patent box
implementation. More generally, there appears to be no substantial difference in the time
trends of the two groups which allows us to base our subsequent analysis on a comparison
between them.
The assumption of a common trend before the foreign patent box implementation can also
be tested econometrically using an event-study design (e.g. Hoynes et al., 2011; Kline, 2012;
Chetty et al., 2014). In this setting, the number of new patent applications of a firm is regressed
on a set of dummies indicating periods before and after the implementation of the patent box
in the country of residence of one of its foreign affiliates. We describe our event-study design
in more detail in Appendix A.3 and further elaborate on the results below. For now, we are
mainly interested in the dummies indicating pre-implementation periods. For our research
design to be valid, the estimated coefficients for these dummies should not be significantly
different from zero indicating that there exists no difference in the pre-implementation trend
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of patent output between treated and non-treated firms.26 We plot the coefficients and the
95% confidence intervals in Panel (b) of Figure 2. The indicator for the year prior to the
implementation is normalized to zero. None of the other pre-implementation dummies is
significantly different from zero and we also cannot reject the hypothesis that they are jointly
equal to zero (F-test statistic 0.63). From this result we infer that our econometric approach
is valid and correctly identifies cross-border spillovers of patent boxes if they exist.
5 Results
5.1 R&D Quantity
Table 5 contains the main estimation results.27 In columns (1) to (4) we present results with
regard to patent havens. In column (1), the cross-border effect is captured by a dummy
BOXHaven that indicates a relevant patent box implementation in the residence country of
a foreign affiliate of a firm. The foreign tax cut leads to a significant increase of domestic
patenting activity by 67 log points. This translates into an rise of annual patent output by
approximately 95% and points to a strong external effect of foreign tax incentives on domestic
research activity. Evaluated at the sample average, the result implies that the patent box
implementation in a foreign affiliate location increases domestic R&D activity from about one
patent every three years to about one patent every one and a half years. Thus, our result
suggests that a decline in the user cost of capital in one location of a multinational group also
affects group members with no relevant tax policy change.
As discussed above, firm-level patent output is also driven by other macroeconomic fac-
tors and policies. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP increases patent output of firms. On
the contrary, an increase in the financing cost measured by the real interest rate or a higher
statutory corporate income tax rate are expected to induce a decline in innovative activity.
Consistent with related studies (e.g. Bloom et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009), our estimates suggest
that an increase in the user cost of R&D capital leads to a decline in corporate R&D invest-
ment. The fact that the coefficient for the patent box dummy remains significant despite the
inclusion of the user cost of R&D capital indicates that our estimates are not the result of
the fiscal competition game described above.28 The significantly positive coefficients of total
assets and the firm age indicate that, consistent with previous findings, larger and also older
firms conduct more R&D.
In column (2) of Table 5 we capture the treatment intensity. Instead of an implementation
26Note that this test is similar in spirit to a Granger (1969) causality test.
27We also ran all regressions without control variables and obtained significant estimates for the variables of
interest which were similar in size to the results of the benchmark regression.
28We also ran regressions restricting the set of control variables to macro-economic factors first and then
excluding all control variables (keeping year-fixed and firm-fixed effects in both cases). The resulting coefficient
estimates were qualitatively similar albeit somewhat larger in magnitude.
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dummy, we use the tax rate divergence between the location of the firm and the patent box
country in the year of the patent box introduction. More specifically, we take the difference
between the corporate income tax rate in the residence country of the firm and the applicable
tax rate for patent profits in the relevant affiliate country after the introduction of the patent
box and interact it with our implementation dummies BOXHaven and BOXNexus. We then
repeat regression (1) using our more sophisticated indicator. Again, the coefficient of interest
is significantly positive. Our results suggest that a patent box that induces a tax difference of
1 percentage point between the residence country of the firm and the relevant affiliate country
raises the number of patents by 2.3%. For instance, take the example of a firm residing in
Germany that has an affiliate in Hungary. The patent box implementation in the affiliate
location in 2003 implied a tax differential of 31.2%. Our estimates suggest that this increased
research activity in the German firm by 71.76%.
In a second step, we use the quality-weighted patent count as a dependent variable to
control for the fact that patents may vary strongly with regard to their quality, usefulness
and applicability (see Hall et al., 2010). Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 present the results from
repeating the previous regressions with this alternative dependent variable. Throughout the
specifications, the coefficients of the patent box implementation dummy as well as the one for
the more sophisticated measure of the patent-box-induced tax difference remain significantly
positive. Again, including location-, firm-, and group-specific controls suggests that our results
are not driven by macroeconomic factors or endogenous firm selection. We note that the
coefficients for the variables of interest are slightly smaller than in the regression with a
simple patent count. This may reflect that there exist cross-border externalities of patent
boxes not only with respect to the quantity of patent output but also with respect to their
quality. Our theoretical analysis suggests that external effects on quality are negative and
thus potentially mitigate the positive quantity effect if this is measured with quality weights.
We turn to this additional effect in more detail below.
Finally, we are also interested in the cross-border effect of nexus patent boxes on R&D
activity. In columns (5) to (8) of Table 5 we present results of a Poisson fixed effects esti-
mation that relates the simple and quality-weighted patent count to a dummy BOXNexus
that switches to one when the residence country of one of the foreign affiliates of the firm
implements a patent box with nexus requirement.
Column (5) reports the results with regard to an implementation dummy which also
contains the full set of controls. The coefficient of interest turns out positive, which potentially
hints to some remaining profit shifting opportunities in nexus patent boxes. When relating
the patent count to the tax difference implied by the patent box implementation rather than
the simple reform dummy, the sign of the estimated coefficient becomes negative. However,
in both specifications the coefficient is small in magnitude and insignificant. Similar results
21
are obtained when accounting for patent quality in columns (7) and (8).29 We investigate
this effect in more detail below. In general, we cannot identify positive spillovers for nexus
patent boxes.30 This is consistent with the notion that patent boxes only reduce the user cost
of R&D capital and thus raise R&D activity in other countries if they do not inhibit profit
shifting via the relocation of intangibles.
5.2 R&D Quality
In Table 6, we present estimates of the cross-border spillover effect of a patent box implemen-
tation on the average quality of patents. Column (1) contains the regression result relying on
a dummy indicating that one of the affiliate countries of a firm turned into a patent haven and
the set of control variables and fixed effects described above. The negative coefficient suggests
that the patent box implementation leads to a reduction in relative patent quality. In column
(1) this regression is repeated using the resulting tax difference from the patent box as the
variable of interest. Again, the estimated coefficient is negative and significant. In columns
(3) and (4), the regressions are repeated with a dummy that takes value one if firms have
an affiliate residing in a country with a nexus patent box implemented or the corresponding
tax difference, respectively. Having an affiliate in such a country reduces the average quality
of domestic patents, albeit to a lesser extent. This result is also obtained when accounting
for the actual tax difference between the location of the patenting firm and its patent box
affiliate.
The negative cross-border effect of patent havens possibly reflects a decrease in the average
profitability of granted patents, which is consistent with our theoretical findings above. Note
that even though the direction of the effect does not depend on the nexus requirement of the
patent box, our analysis suggests that the underlying mechanism differs between the two types
of patent boxes. This may also explain the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients. The
estimated effect on average patent quality is about five and a half times larger for a patent
haven than for a nexus patent box. We therefore conclude that the effect on the intensive
margin, which is driven by foreign patent havens that allow firms to conduct more but also
less profitable R&D, is more pronounced in practice. In comparison to this, the effect on the
extensive margin, which results from nexus patent boxes that lure away R&D projects with
high profitability, is much smaller.
29We note that the observed effect for the quality-weighted patent count may also be driven by the negative
impact of foreign patent boxes on domestic patent quality that is suggested by our theoretical framework.
30In untabulated tests we also included both implementation dummies BOXHaven and BOXNexus as well as
there interaction into one regression. We found a significantly positive coefficient for BOXHaven that is similar
to the results in Table 5 while the coefficients for BOXNexus and the interaction are insignificant and small in
magnitude.
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Table 6: Patent Quality
Patent Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BOXHaven -0.269**
(0.108)
BOXHaven ×∆t -0.009**
(0.004)
BOXNexus -0.048***
(0.015)
BOXNexus ×∆t -0.002***
(0.001)
R&D exp. 0.111***
(0.034)
0.110***
(0.034)
0.129***
(0.037)
0.127***
(0.037)
Log GDP p.c. -0.205**
(0.101)
-0.205**
(0.101)
-0.190*
(0.114)
-0.191*
(0.114)
CIT 0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
GDP Growth 0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.003)
User Cost of R&D -0.913***
(0.316)
-0.914***
(0.316)
0.480
(0.401)
0.467
(0.401)
Real interest rate -0.621*
(0.320)
-0.620*
(0.320)
-0.464
(0.352)
-0.467
(0.352)
Log no. of affiliates -0.034
(0.022)
-0.034
(0.022)
-0.041
(0.025)
-0.041
(0.025)
Log Age -0.006
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.013)
-0.011
(0.015)
-0.010
(0.015)
Log Total Assets -0.022***
(0.004)
-0.022***
(0.004)
-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.024***
(0.004)
Working Capital 0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
Log Capital Intensity 0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
N 50,766 47,225 39,613 36,136
No. of firms 21,513 19,857 15,772 14,117
R2 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.018
Estimation of an OLS fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the logarithm of average patent quality per
year and firm for patents for which the majority of inventors does not reside outside the country of residence of
the firm. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions
include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%.
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5.3 Additional Robustness Checks
The validity of our results is reassured when exposing them to various robustness checks. We
discuss the most important tests here and relegate the corresponding results to the Appendix.
First, we conduct several sample checks. Multinational groups often operate multiple af-
filiates within a country. The spillover effect resulting from the introduction of a patent box
regime in a foreign affiliate can thus affect affiliates within a country differently. Hence, in
Table A.6, we consolidate all group affiliates in the same country and re-estimate the main
specification. Reassuringly, we find results which are very similar to those in Table 5. Hence,
we can preclude that the spillover effect is limited to single affiliates only. Another concern
may be that the firms in our sample are not sufficiently comparable since we include both
domestic and multinational corporations. We verify that this is not the case by reestimating
our benchmark results with a sample restricted to MNEs. Results are presented in Table A.7.
Reassuringly, the coefficient estimates are very similar to those in our benchmark regression.
Our results are thus not driven by incorrectly comparing multinational firms to domestic
groups or stand-alone entities.
Second, we check whether the direction of our estimated effect is driven by the model choice
by reestimating equation (3) in a linear model which relates the logarithm of the patent count
to the specification described above. This approach excludes all firm-year observations in
which no patent was granted. In an additional estimation we avoid this problem by replacing
the resulting missing values by zero. The results for this exercise are displayed in Table A.8
and reveal that qualitatively similar effects are detected in a linear fixed effects regression
model.
Untabulated robustness checks include re-estimations of the benchmark model including
industry-specific and location-specific time trends as well as separate time trends for MNEs
and domestic firms. We obtain virtually the same results in all specifications.
Third, the differences in average assets, age and group size between treated and untreated
firms (see Table 4) could be indicators for endogenous sorting causing a self-selection bias
(Wooldridge, 2010). For example, a member of a large group is more likely to be assigned
to the treatment group simply because of having more foreign affiliates and, thus, having a
higher probability that one of these foreign affiliates gets access to a patent box. However,
if affiliates of large groups exhibit a different evolution of patent output during the sample
period, comparability of treatment and control group is limited. To verify that this precludes
any selection bias, we re-estimate our benchmark results by applying matching approaches
to account for structural differences between treatment and control group. This allows us to
compare treated and untreated firms with similar characteristics. We employ Propensity Score
Matching (PSM) as well as Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). Matching is conducted on the
full set of control variables with values in 2000 to capture structural differences of firms at
the beginning of our sample period as well as variable values for current differences in each
24
year. With matching on variable values in 2000 we establish initially similar compositions of
treatment and control group but allow for heterogeneous developments of firms within groups.
When matching on current observables, we balance the sample in each year to capture time-
varying differences in firm development. For PSM, the propensity score for being treated is
calculated using a Probit regression with treatment status as dependent variable and firm
characteristics as controls31. The propensity score is used to find for each treated firm suffi-
ciently similar firms from the untreated group to conduct a Difference-in-Difference analysis
in patent output. However, despite the popularity of PSM, its underlying Probit regression is
likely to be prone to outliers resulting in bias and inefficiency (King & Nielsen, 2015). An al-
ternative that avoids these problems is CEM which, unlike PSM, is a fully non-parametrically
procedure. The underlying idea is to coarsen the values of each variable into groups and then
identify similar firms according to variable values assigned to similar groups. Based on these
group assignments, a weight for each firm is calculated. The more variable realizations of a
treated and an untreated firm get assigned to the same group, the higher the resulting weight.
We use the resulting weights and re-estimate equation (3). Reassuringly, the estimated aver-
age treatment effect on the treated (ATT) across different matching specifications as reported
in Table A.10 is similar to our benchmark regression results in Table 5. Therefore, we rule
out endogenous sorting of firms into the treatment group.
5.4 Extensions
In this section, we consider several extensions to our benchmark analysis. We examine hetero-
geneities across industry sectors, we observe the evolution of the cross-border effect of patent
boxes over time using an event-study design and we compute the elasticity of R&D output to
various measures of the effective tax burden within company groups. The first two analyses
aim at further verifying the plausibility of our results while the latter exercise highlights more
general aspects of our results. Finally, we complement our analysis of patent output using
additional information on R&D expenditures of German firms to check whether the impact of
the foreign, output-related tax incentives we study is also reflected in the structure of domestic
R&D spending.
Industry Heterogeneity
With regard to industry heterogeneity, industries with shorter development phases and a
lower level of input costs are likely to react earlier and stronger as they can more easily adjust
their patent output to external incentives. Firms that are commonly associated with such
characteristics are those active in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
sector. In contrast, the development processes of manufacturing firms, in particular those
31For a more detailed description, see Table A.9.
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active in the pharmaceutical and chemical sector, are usually slow and costly. Their response
to foreign tax incentives should thus be less pronounced.
To check whether the data reflects such a pattern, we repeat the quantity regressions
described above for two sub-samples of firms. First, we only include ICT firms32 and then
restrict the sample to manufacturing firms33 other than ICT. Results are presented in Table
A.3 in the Appendix. Columns (1) and (2) contain the results for ICT firms. Consistent with
the notion that R&D output of these firms responds more quickly, the estimated coefficient
for BOXHaven is substantially higher than that in our benchmark regression. All other factors
equal, this implies that for ICT firms, taxation constitutes a more important cost factor and
a decrease in the tax burden on R&D investment constitutes a greater incentive to raise their
R&D activity. In contrast, the response of other manufacturing firms is weaker. The estimated
coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are significantly positive but of lower magnitude than the
ones in our benchmark results. Consistent with prior literature, these firms have longer R&D
processes and thus do not adjust their research output to policy incentives as quickly. Finally,
we do not find cross-border effects for nexus patent boxes.
Dynamics of the Spillovers
Next, we apply an event-study design to the analysis of patent havens which is described in
detail in Appendix A.3. The general idea of the event study is to regress the number of patents
on individual dummies indicating periods before and after the implementation of a foreign
patent haven. In this more flexible setup, we can explore the evolution of the cross-border
effect over time. In particular, one may expect a lagged response because an increase in patent
output requires prior research efforts.
Figure 3: Event-study Design
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Figure 3 plots the results of the event-study analysis. The effect is normalized to zero in the
year before the patent box implementation and the coefficients have to be interpreted as the
effect of the foreign patent box on patent output relative to the year prior to the reform. As
32NACE Rev. 2 codes 5821, 5829, 6010, 6020, 6110, 6120, 6130, 6190, 6201, 6202, 6203, 6209, 6311, 6312, 6391, 6399,
2611, 2612, 2620, 2630, 2640, 2651, 2680, 2731, 2732.
33NACE Rev. 2 codes 10 to 33.
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highlighted above, we find no significant impact of the patent box prior to its implementation
which is reassuring with regard to the causality of our findings. We also observe that the
effect does not materialize immediately. Rather, a significant response is obtained starting
in the second year after the patent box implementation. This suggests that some time is
needed for R&D processes to adjust. In year four after the implementation, the coefficient
decreases and becomes insignificant. Even though this might imply that in the long run the
cross-border effect of the patent box diminishes, we refrain from interpreting the coefficients
in this way because long-run estimates of the firm response are more precisely determined
using the non-linear count model in our benchmark analysis. Generally, obtaining reliable
long-run estimates in an event study would require a longer observation period and, as in
Kline (2012), the coefficients for the event window ends may be biased as they give unequal
weights to patent boxes implemented early or late in our observation period since the sample
is unbalanced in event time.
The Effective Tax Burden of R&D
Finally, we turn to implications of our findings for the measurement of the tax burden on
corporate R&D investment in the presence of cross-border spillovers of patent boxes. An
important issue raised by the literature on tax havens and investment of MNEs (e.g. Hong
& Smart, 2010) is that the domestic tax rate of a jurisdiction may not be very informative
with respect to the tax environment faced by such firms for investing in this jurisdiction.
Since internationally operating firms are able to shift part of their profit from one location
to another, their effective tax burden in one location is likely to depend on the applicable
tax rates in the whole group. With sufficiently low costs of profit shifting, such as in the case
of patent rights, it is the location with the lowest tax rate in the group that determines the
effective tax burden of its members.
We test this notion by replacing the main variable of interest BOX in equation (3) by
several measures for the effective tax rate for profits faced by a firm. We are interested in
how R&D activity reacts to each of these measures. They include the statutory corporate
income tax rate and the minimum tax rate on patent profits within the whole group. For the
latter, we again distinguish between nexus patent boxes and patent havens. Effectively, we
extend our analysis beyond the particular incidence of a foreign patent box implementation
and exploit the full variance of tax rates on patent profits in a multinational group to identify
cross-border effects on patent output.
Following Hong & Smart (2010) and Slemrod & Wilson (2009), the statutory tax rate
should be relevant only for firms without foreign affiliates. The minimum tax rate within a
group should be more informative for the whole sample but only if we take into account tax
rate reductions of patent boxes without nexus requirement. Table 7 displays the results of
this exercise. In column (1), the variable of interest is the statutory corporate income tax
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Table 7: R&D Activity and Corporate Taxation
No. of new Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Domestic
Firms
Full Sample Full Sample
CIT -0.004
(0.002)
-0.007**
(0.003)
Minimum Tax Rate (No Nexus) -0.004**
(0.002)
Minimum Tax Rate (Nexus) -0.003
(0.002)
N 229,723 175,163 229,723 229,723
No. of firms 20,414 15,701 20,414 20,414
Pseudo LL -115,442 -77,860 -115,439 -115,442
Estimation of a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the number of new patents per year and
firm for which the majority of inventors does not reside outside the country of residence of the firm. Cluster
robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm-
and year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Controls
are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
rate. The respective coefficient is negative with a tax cut by one percentage point causing an
increase in R&D activity by about 0.4%. This result is, however, insignificant, implying that
the statutory tax rate is not very informative with respect to the tax environment of a firm
in our sample. In column (2), we restrict the sample to firms without foreign affiliates. The
coefficient for the statutory corporate income tax rate is now larger and significantly negative.
Our results suggest that for domestically operating firms a one percentage point decrease in
the corporate income tax rate would raise R&D activity by about 0.7%. Next, we use the
minimum tax rate on patent profits within the group of affiliates of a firm as a measure of the
tax burden in column (3). In doing so, we take into account tax reductions resulting from the
implementation of patent havens. In contrast to the regression in column (1), the coefficient
for this adjusted tax rate measure is significantly negative and implies that an effective tax
rate decrease by one percentage point leads to an increase of patent output by 0.4%.
Thus, our results indicate that the effective tax burden of a firm with respect to R&D
investment is better described by also taking into account tax rate changes in the whole
group. The statutory corporate income tax rate remains, however, informative for firms that
operate in one country only. Consistent with our expectation that spillovers only occur from
patent havens that allow for profit shifting, we do not find a significant effect of the minimum
group tax rate when we account for tax cuts induced by foreign nexus patent boxes. The
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corresponding coefficient in column (4) is negative but insignificant.
R&D Expenditures
Our analysis focuses on R&D output measured by patent applications as this captures the firm
response that directly corresponds to the tax incentive we study. In the following extension,
we investigate how and to what extent the output response transmits to the R&D input choice
of a firm. Although firm innovation is not necessarily proportional to its R&D expenditures
(Hausman et al., 1984), the structure of the latter should still reflect the underlying tax
incentives for R&D output.
Detailed information on R&D inputs is scarce. Corporations are usually not required to
report them and are generally reluctant to publish related information because of the strategic
information contained in these figures. In the following analysis we use confidential survey data
collected from German corporations.34 The data is collected on a biannual basis and feeds
into the Eurostat database on corporate R&D. Since the identifier used by the Stifterverband
is identical to the one in the Bureau van Dijk databases, we can directly link our ownership
and tax policy information as well as the balance sheet items used as controls to the R&D
expenditures data of the Stifterverband. In total, we observe 7,682 firms from 2001 to 2013
on a biannual basis (30,134 firm-year observations) for which we also have information on the
relevant control variables.
The empirical analysis follows specification (3) but replaces the patent count with several
measures of R&D expenditures.35 We focus on the implementation of patent havens for which
we observe a significantly positive response of patent output.36 Results are presented in Table
A.5 in the Appendix. In column (1) we relate internal R&D expenditures to the indicator of a
foreign patent haven implementation. The effect is small and insignificant which suggests that
the increase in corporate innovation triggered by the foreign patent box is not immediately
reflected in an increase of internal R&D expenditures. However, we find a significant impact
of the patent box on the structure of internal R&D spending. In column (2) and (3), we
separate it into expenses for applied and experimental research according to the Frascati
Manual (OECD, 2015).37 Applied R&D aims at generating new products and processes while
experimental research further develops existing innovations. Expenditures of German firms for
the latter increase with the implementation of a foreign patent box. This may reflect that the
34We use the R&D survey of the Wissenschaftsstatistik of the Stifterverband.
35Since the analysis is restricted to firms residing in Germany, we capture macro-economic shifts by in-
cluding year-fixed effects as in the benchmark specification and drop macro-economic control variables due to
collinearity.
36We also analyzed the response to patent box implementations with nexus requirement (unreported) and
found no significant effect on R&D inputs.
37A third item is basic research, which is, however, usually unrelated to business goals and thus of minor
importance for the firm. In an unreported estimation we found no effect of foreign patent box regimes on this
type of expenditures.
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tax cut on patent profits in one of their affiliate location incentivizes firms to spend more on
the development of existing ideas in order to generate patents that can later be transferred to
the low-tax affiliate. Doing so avoids the substantial fixed costs of starting new R&D projects
but still allows firms to benefit from the profit shifting opportunity. The negative impact on
applied research expenses is probably a result of firms concentrating resources in experimental
R&D activity. These results are also consistent with our finding that R&D quality decreases
in response to the patent box implementation since the innovative character of experimental
R&D activity, to which expenditures are shifted, is generally lower than that of applied R&D
activity.
Finally, we estimate a significantly negative coefficient for the foreign patent box indicator
when we relate it to external contract R&D outside the group. In contrast to internal R&D
activity, contract research is easily shifted by assigning the affiliate in the patent box location
as the new purchaser of these services.38 The result thus probably reflects that firms shift those
R&D activities abroad which are only loosely attached via contract arrangements. In contrast,
internal R&D expenditures are restructured in adjustment to the foreign tax incentive while
not altering their overall level.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we combine information on firm ownership, research activity and output-related
R&D tax incentives to identify cross-border spillover effects of tax policy within multinational
groups. Our results indicate that within multinational companies, the patent box implemen-
tation in one location also affects R&D output at other locations of the group. It increases the
research activity there by 2.3% per percentage point of the induced tax rate differential. On
average, this raises the patent output from about one patent every three years to about one
patent every one and a half years. Consistent with our theoretical analysis, we find this effect
only for patent boxes without nexus requirement (patent havens). In contrast, patent boxes
with nexus requirement effectively preclude tax benefits from the transfer of intangibles and,
thus, do not lower the effective tax burden on R&D investment across borders. Furthermore,
we show that, in line with the predictions of a theoretical model, cross-border spillovers of
patent boxes on patent quality are negative.
These results have several important implications. First, they provide empirical evidence
with regard to the theoretical analyses by Desai et al. (2006) and Hong & Smart (2010), who
argue that the presence of low-tax countries reduces the user cost of capital for investment
in high-tax countries. It remains questionable whether tax havens are beneficial from an
overall welfare perspective (see Slemrod & Wilson, 2009), but our analysis shows that the
38Since the measure refers to contract R&D outside of the MNE, exit taxes and CFC rules are also unlikely
to apply in this case.
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proposed mechanism is a relevant phenomenon for investments in intangible assets which are
particularly mobile with regard to the allocation of related profits.
Second, these findings inform the ongoing debate on patent boxes. Some countries have
argued that patent boxes are not effective in fostering domestic research activity but merely
constitute an instrument for harmful tax competition. Indeed, existing empirical studies have
not yet robustly identified a direct effect of patent boxes on domestic innovation. However,
our results suggest that an indirect cross-border effect exists. If patent box regimes include
non-domestically developed patents, the implicit tax reduction for multinational companies
increases corporate R&D activity in other countries. An assessment of the overall welfare
impact is precluded by the fact that we do not observe foregone revenue in the location of
the domestic firm. Nevertheless, the results presented above suggest that when restricting
profit shifting opportunities to foreign patent havens, governments must weigh the expected
increase in domestic tax revenue against the negative impact on domestic research activity.
Somewhat surprisingly, those patent boxes that provide the best opportunity for profit shifting
are actually the regimes that have the strongest positive effect on research activity in non-
patent box countries.
Results from our theoretical analysis suggest that there are two consecutive firm responses
to the creation of a foreign patent haven. Companies first raise R&D output and then locate
the resulting patent rights to the patent box location. In our empirical analysis we have
verified the first step which is relevant for the cross-border implications of patent boxes on
real R&D activity. More generally, we are interested in the impact of patent boxes on corporate
innovation rather than on the resulting profit allocation. As it is the case for many corporate
investment decisions, the former effect depends on the expected tax rate on future profits.
Thus, the change of prospective taxation induced by the patent box, which we capture in our
empirical specification, is decisive.
Even though, we do not identify the second step, we note that recent findings by Ciaramella
(2017) and Gaessler et al. (2017) on patent relocation and the implementation of patent boxes,
however, strongly point to the relevance of this effect. Furthermore, we note that empirical
findings of previous studies suggest that profit shifting via the transfer of patent rights is a
very relevant phenomenon (see Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012). In fact,
a recent empirical analysis by Koethenbuerger et al. (2016) on the effect of patent boxes on
cross-border profit shifting suggests that the introduction of these regimes leads to substantial
transfer of profits to the affiliates that are located in the implementing countries.39 Consistent
with our analysis, this effect is confined to patent boxes without sufficient nexus requirements.
39On the reverse effect, Chen et al. (2016) show that patent boxes reduce outward profit shifting in the
countries where they are implemented.
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Appendix
A.3 Patent Boxes and Average Patent Quality
The average profits are given by
Π =
∫ p˜i
p˜i∗
pisf (pis) dpis.
The change in Π with respect to the tax differential is given by
dΠ = −
(
(1− α) (cp − ch) p˜if (p˜i)
((1− α) ∆t)2 + α
chp˜i
∗f (p˜i∗)
(1− th + α∆t)2
)
d∆t < 0.
A.3 Composite Patent Quality Indicator
Patent quality is a latent variable which is not directly observable in the data. To approximate
it, we follow the approach proposed by Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004) and employ a multiple-
indicator model with one unobserved common factor. We use three different indicators, namely
forward citations, patent family size and number of patent classifications codes (IPC classes).
Therefore, the underlying equations for the multiple-indicator model are
yk,s = λkvs + βX + ek,s, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where yk,s is the value of quality indicator k for patent s, vs indicates the common factor,
λk represents the factor loading, X contains common controls and ek,s ∼ N(0, σ2) is the
idiosyncratic component with Cov(ek,s, ek,r) = 0, s 6= r. Since the term λkvs is latent, we
estimate the reduced form of the equations:
yk,s = βX + uk,s, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where uk,s = λkvs+ek,s combines a common component λkvs and an idiosyncratic component
ek,s. We estimate these equations using 3SLS where X contains the year of application and
the main technology class of the patent. To gather λk and vs, we conduct a factor analysis
using maximum likelihood to decompose uk,s. The estimated factor loadings are presented in
Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Factor loadings
Indicator Factor loading
Forward citations 0.6201
Patent family size 0.3593
Patent classification codes 0.1229
Factor analysis of the residuals from regressing each indicator on year and industry class dummies. Factor
loadings represent both weighting of the indicator and correlation between indicator and patent quality.
We use the estimated factor loadings to calculate the composite quality indicator for each
patent. The composite quality indicator is a relative measure to determine the quality of
patents and is normally distributed with mean zero. To construct the quality-weighted annual
patent count, we transform the distribution by adding the value of the patent with lowest
patent quality so that all composite quality indicators turn positive. After this transformation
the composite quality indicator for each patent has a positive value and can be used as weight
for summing up patent output. The implied relative ordering of the quality of patents is
unaffected by this transformation.
A.3 User Cost of R&D Investment
The computation of the user cost follows the derivation of Bloom et al. (2002) who extend its
standard expression as presented by Hall & Jorgenson (1967) to R&D investment. The user
cost is defined as the pre-tax financial return ρ for a marginal R&D investment project (i.e.
a project with zero economic rent). The economic rent of an R&D project is given by
R = (1 + i) dVt = dDt + dVt+1
=
(ρ+ δ)
(
1− τCIT )+ (1− δ)A
1 + r
− (1−A)
where dVt is the change in the market value of the firm and dDt is the change in dividends
paid out by the firm that results from the investment. i denotes the nominal and r the real
market interest rate and δ is the economic rate of depreciation. A is the net present value of
allowances. Following Thomson (2013) and Warda (2002), we assume the R&D investment
to consist of an investment in labor (60%), machinery and equipment (5%), buildings (5%)
and other current expenditures (30%). A accounts for additional deductions, tax credits and
accelerated depreciation. To obtain the user cost, we set R = 0 and solve for ρ. This yields
ρ =
1− (AD +AC)
1− τCIT (r + δ) (A.1)
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We compute ρct for every country and year and follow Bloom et al. (2002) in setting δ = 0.3
and r = 0.05. Tax policy variables are obtained from the IBFD database.
A.3 Sample Selection
Table A.2: Sample Selection
Number of Firms in
the Sample
Firms in patenting sectors that conduct R&D with data for 2000-2012 38,906
Excluding firms located in patent box countries 30,923
Excluding firms with a change in the firm structure with respect to
patent box locations
26,393
Trimming at the 99% quantile of the patent count 26,314
Excluding firms with no patent application in the observation period 22,559
This table displays the sample selection. Patenting sectors are defined by 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes 10-32,
51-53, 58-63, 69-74 and 77-82. Firms that conduct R&D are defined as firms included in the PATSTAT database
that have successfully filed a patent application at any point in time.
A.3 Event-study design
The event-study design follows the standard setup (e.g. Hoynes et al., 2011; Kline, 2012;
Chetty et al., 2014) and is specified as:
Pijct = α−4
t−2000∑
n=4
bj,t+n +
−2∑
n=−3
αnbj,t−n +
4∑
n=0
αnbj,t−n + α5
2012−t∑
n=5
bj,t−n
+ βXit + γZjt + δCct + φt + φi + uit. (A.2)
Pijct is the number of newly granted patent applications Pijct of firm i which is member
of multinational group j and is located in country c in period t, and bj,t is a dummy that
indicates whether in year t group j has an affiliate in a country where a patent box without
nexus requirement is implemented and zero otherwise. Within the first and last year in our
sample, 2000 and 2012, we define an event window of 10 years, that is, we observe 4 years
before and 5 years after the implementation of the patent box as well as the implementation
year itself. In each year, we thus compare the treated firms to those that do not have a
foreign patent box affiliate. Following Kline (2012) we adjust the end points of the event
window to indicate whether a foreign patent box has been implemented 4 or more years
before (upper window limit) and 5 or more years after a given year (lower window limit) in
order to mitigate collinearity with the year-fixed effects. To avoid perfect collinearity among
34
the patent box indicators, the regressor in the year before the implementation is dropped and
thereby normalized to zero. As a consequence, the remaining coefficients αt are interpreted
as the effect of the patent box implementation on Pijct relative to the pre-reform year. The
regression is complemented by a set of control variables which are identical to the main
specification (3) as well as a set of firm-fixed and year-fixed effects.
A.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 4: Graphical Illustration of the Conceptual Framework
This figure illustrates the concept of this paper. The focus of the analysis is R&D activity of firm 1, located in country A
with an affiliate in country B. We investigate the response of R&D activity of firm 1 to the patent box implementation
in country B. Empirically, this is done by comparing firm 1 to another firm 2 which may have a a foreign affiliate in a
country C but is not linked via an affiliate to the patent box country B.
Country A
Country BCountry C
R&D
Firm 1
R&D
Firm 2
Affiliate
Affiliate
Patent Box Implementation
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Table A.4: R&D Activity and Corporate Taxation: Controls
No. of new Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Domestic
Firms
Full Sample Full Sample
R&D exp. 0.340***
(0.065)
0.319***
(0.086)
0.347***
(0.063)
0.352***
(0.063)
Log GDP p.c. -0.387*
(0.224)
-0.237
(0.254)
-0.390*
(0.223)
-0.391*
(0.223)
GDP Growth -0.000
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.000
(0.005)
0.001
(0.005)
User Cost of R&D -5.560***
(0.555)
-6.814***
(0.627)
-5.492***
(0.553)
-5.563***
(0.554)
Real interest rate -1.382**
(0.545)
-1.882***
(0.690)
-1.338**
(0.531)
-1.276**
(0.530)
Log no. of affiliates 0.120***
(0.039)
0.110**
(0.046)
0.115***
(0.039)
0.117***
(0.039)
Log Age 0.088***
(0.021)
0.077***
(0.025)
0.087***
(0.021)
0.088***
(0.021)
Log Total Assets 0.035***
(0.005)
0.032***
(0.006)
0.036***
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.005)
Working Capital 0.000
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Log Capital Intensity 0.017***
(0.005)
0.013**
(0.005)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.017***
(0.005)
This table reports the coefficients of the control variables for the estimations reported in Table 7. Estimation of
a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the number of new patents per year and firm for which
the majority of inventors does not reside outside the country of residence of the firm. Cluster robust standard
errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed
effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table A.5: R&D Expenditures
(1) (3) (4) (5)
Internal R&D Expenditures External
R&D Ex-
penditures
Total Experimental Applied
BOXHaven -0.0290
(0.140)
1.491**
(0.593)
-0.603***
(0.129)
-0.893***
(0.175)
No. of affiliates 0.129*
(0.070)
0.239**
(0.0946)
0.049
(0.0942)
0.359
(0.297)
Log Age -0.054
(0.060)
-0.022
(0.0766)
-0.077
(0.114)
-0.044
(0.175)
Log Total Assets 0.040***
(0.011)
0.239**
(0.095)
0.058***
(0.014)
0.058
(0.036)
Working Capital -0.000**
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
-0.008***
(0.002)
Log Capital Intensity 0.001
(0.007)
0.009
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.012)
0.010
(0.019)
N 30,134 29,712 29,764 15,625
No. of firms 7,682 7,578 7,593 3,528
Pseudo LL -1,851,681 -1,833,620 -1,791,755 -782,394
Estimation of a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable are the R&D expenditures in the indicated area per
year and firm. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions
include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Data source R&D expenditures: SV Wissenschaftsstatistik GmbH, RDC, R&D Survey 2001-2013, own calculations.
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Table A.9: Probit Regression for PSM
Ever being treated Treated in current year
(1) (2)
Log Age -0.028***
(0.192)
-0.011***
(0.005)
Log No. Affiliates 1.155***
(0.006)
1.081***
(0.005)
Log Total Assets 0.049***
(0.005)
0.058***
(0.003)
Working Capital 0.057***
(0.018)
-0.000***
(0.000)
Log Capital Intensity -0.044***
(0.006)
-0.012***
(0.003)
Controls with year 2000 values 
Country-industry FE  
Year FE 
N 212,009 273,062
Log Likelihood -
27,534.209
-33,819.778
Pseudo R² 0.659 0.652
For Propensity Score Matching (PSM), a Probit estimation is conducted. Table A.9 presents the results. In column (1),
we regress a dummy equal to 1 if during the sample period a patent box regime without nexus requirement is implemented
in a foreign affiliate country on the firm characteristics in the year 2000. Doing so ensures equality of treated firms and
untreated firms at the beginning of the treatment period. In column (2), we regress a dummy equal to 1 only in the
year if the patent box in the foreign affiliate is implemented in the current year on firm characteristics in the current
year. With this specification we aim to find comparables for specific years. Estimation of a Probit model. The dependent
variable is a dummy for being treated at least once during the sample period (column 1) or for being treated in the
current year (column 2). All regressions include country- and industry-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the
significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table A.10: Average treatment effect on the treated using matching
No. of new patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATT 0.608***
(0.199)
0.637***
(0.058)
0.804**
(0.402)
0.277***
(0.035)
PSM  
CEM  
Matched on initial firm characteristics  
Matched on yearly firm characteristics  
ATT denotes ’average treatment effect of the treated’. The calculation of the ATT includes firm-fixed effects
if feasible (columns 1 and 3). Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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